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REVISITING CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AS 
“OCCURRENCES” UNDER CGL INSURANCE
POLICIES
Christopher C. French* 
Imagine a situation in which a homeowner hires a contractor to redo a 
bathroom, for example, and the work is done incompetently such that the 
plumbing leaks and causes damage to other parts of the house.  If the 
homeowner sues the contractor to recover the costs of repairing the faulty 
workmanship and the damage caused by the faulty workmanship, has there been 
an “occurrence” that is covered by the contractor’s Commercial General 
Liability (“CGL”) insurance policy?  This article provides an answer to that 
question. 
The issue of whether construction defects are occurrences under CGL 
insurance policies has been litigated frequently in recent years.  Historically, 
courts have been divided in their approaches to deciding the issue and in their 
conclusions.  This article contains a comprehensive, nationwide analysis and 
critique of state courts’ approaches and decisions on the issue.  It also proposes 
an analytical framework in which courts can decide the issue with the theoretical 
and public policy concerns, such as moral hazard, the compensation of injured 
parties, and the enforcement of contracts in mind. 
 Christopher C. French is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Penn State Law School; 
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
the legal research contributions of Dustin Marlan, Amy Ream, and Tracey Timlin to this 
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine someone hires a general contractor to completely redo the master 
bathroom of the person’s home.  To provide the dream bathroom the homeowner 
wants, the entire bathroom is stripped down to the studs.  New plumbing and 
electrical work must be installed because the location of the vanity, toilet, and 
shower are all changed.  The general contractor hired to do the job is a small, 
local business with four employees and has annual revenues of approximately 
$500,000.  The general contractor’s limited assets are comprised primarily of the 
tools and equipment needed to do construction work.  The general contractor has 
both workmen’s compensation insurance and Commercial General Liability 
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(“CGL”) insurance.  To complete the electrical and plumbing portions of the job, 
the general contractor hires an electrician and a master plumber as 
subcontractors. 
The finished bathroom looks fantastic, and the homeowner is initially 
elated, but a month after the job is completed, water starts dripping into the living 
room, which is located below the new bathroom.  The flooring and expensive 
paintings in the living room are ruined.  The cost to repair the damage in the 
living room, replace the expensive paintings, and fix the leaking pipes in the 
bathroom is significant.  The homeowner’s calls to the general contractor are 
unreturned because the general contractor does not have the skills necessary to 
fix the defective plumbing in the new bathroom or the money to replace the 
flooring and paintings in the living room.  The homeowner then sues the general 
contractor, who in turn tenders the claim to its CGL insurer.  The insurer denies 
coverage on the grounds that the defective workmanship is not an “occurrence” 
under the CGL policy; so, the claim is not covered. 
This hypothetical scenario is actually a daily reality for many homeowners 
and contractors in America, and the resolution of such claims has been a 
patchwork quilt of inconsistent results and analyses by the courts from state to 
state.1  The judicial discord centers on the issue of whether defective 
workmanship is an “occurrence” under CGL policies. 
“Occurrence” is defined under standard form CGL policies, currently used 
by most insurers, as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions.”2  Notably, the term 
“accident” is not defined. 
In essence, the insurer’s argument is that construction defects, such as the 
defective plumbing work in the bathroom hypothetical, are not occurrences 
because it is reasonably foreseeable that a contractor who does defective work 
will be legally required to either fix the faulty workmanship or pay for it.  Thus, 
claims related to defective workmanship are not the result of “accidents.”  
Insurers also argue that CGL policies would effectively become warrantees or 
performance bonds regarding the quality of a contractor’s work if CGL policies 
covered construction defects, which is not the purpose of liability insurance. 
In response, contractors argue they do not intend to do their work 
 1.  The author first addressed this subject in December 2011.  See Christopher C. 
French, Construction Defects: Are They “Occurrences”?, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 22-41 (2011) 
(addressing state courts’ varying approaches and conclusions regarding the issue of whether 
construction defects are “occurrences”).  Since 2011, numerous state supreme courts have 
addressed the issue of whether construction defects can constitute occurrences under CGL 
policies.  This article updates the research contained in the earlier article and provides a 
current analysis of the issue.
 2.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (2007), reprinted in DONALD S. MALECKI, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE GUIDE app. J, § V(13), at 479 (9th ed. 2011). 
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defectively or expect that their work will cause damage.  By this logic, defective 
workmanship is unintentional, which means it is accidental, so it is an 
occurrence.  Contractors further argue that they buy CGL insurance specifically 
to protect themselves against liability claims related to their business - 
construction.  If construction defect claims, the most common claims asserted 
against contractors, were not covered by CGL insurance, then why would or 
should a contractor even buy CGL insurance? 
By way of analogy, consider auto insurance.  People intentionally drive 
cars.  It is reasonably foreseeable that if a person drives negligently by, for 
example, texting while driving or looking at the scenery on the side of the road 
instead of the road itself, the driver may hit someone or something.  It is also 
foreseeable that the driver would be held legally liable for the injuries or damage 
she causes when she does so.  Does that mean auto insurance does not or should 
not cover such liabilities?  Of course not, because that is the very reason people 
have auto insurance – to cover their liabilities for the injuries or damage resulting 
from their negligent driving.  No one can tenably argue that because car crashes 
are the foreseeable result of negligent driving, auto insurance should not cover 
the injuries and damages associated with car crashes.  Are insurance claims 
related to defective workmanship fundamentally different from insurance claims 
related to car crashes? 
To address the issue of whether construction defects are occurrences under 
CGL policies, this article proceeds in four parts.  Part I sets forth relevant policy 
language, such as the definitions of “occurrence” and “property damage,” as well 
as the “business risk” exclusions contained in CGL policies.  Part II addresses 
the principles of insurance policy interpretation relevant to the determination of 
whether construction defects are occurrences.  Part III discusses the courts’ 
treatment of the issue and the various approaches that courts have taken in 
resolving the issue.  Part IV provides an analytical framework in which courts 
can decide the issue when it is presented to them. 
I. THE POLICY LANGUAGE
A. The Insuring Agreement 
Under the Insurance Services Office, Inc.’s (“ISO”)3 current standard form 
 3.  ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that provides a 
variety of services to many insurers.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 
879 n.6 (Fla. 2007).  One of ISO’s primary functions is to draft policy forms that are then 
submitted to state insurance regulators for approval.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).  As a provider of services to approximately 1400 property and 
casualty insurers, ISO “is the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for 
CGL insurance.” Id.  As a result, “most CGL insurance written in the United States is 
written on [ISO] forms.”  Id.
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CGL policy, the basic insuring agreement language that sets forth the insurer’s 
payment obligations to the policyholder provides as follows: 
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY 
1.  Insuring Agreement 
a.  We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or 
“property damage” to which this insurance applies. . . . 
b.  This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property 
damage” only if: 
(1)  The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an 
 “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory . . . .”4
B. The Definitions of “Property Damage” and “Occurrence” 
 “Property damage” is defined as “ [p]hysical injury to tangible 
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. . . .”5  Notably, 
the definition does not make a distinction between property that is created 
by the contractor/policyholder (i.e., the contractor’s workmanship) and 
separate property owned by a third party, such as the homeowner (e.g., the 
rest of the house). 
For many years, “occurrence” was defined in ISO’s standard form CGL 
policies as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, 
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended 
from the standpoint of the insured . . . .”6  Under this definition, to determine 
whether there was an occurrence, the analysis focused on whether there 
was an accident that resulted in bodily injury or property damage that the 
policyholder did not expect or intend.7  In short, the question amounts to:  
did unexpected and unintended bodily injury or property damage result 
from the policyholder’s actions? 
 Beginning in 1986, and continuing today in the current version of ISO’s 
standard form CGL policy, “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
 4.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (2007), supra note 2, app. J, § I(1), at 466. 
 5.  Id. § V(17), at 480. 
 6.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Comprehensive General 
Liability Insurance Coverage Form (1973), supra note 2, app. A, at 259 (emphasis added).   
 7.  See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1978) (ruling “the school building fire was not an insurable ‘occurrence’ under the 
policy because it was not an ‘accident’” in a case where a boy intentionally lit a trash can on 
fire and the fire spread to the rest of the school).
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conditions.”8  As courts were already treating the “expected or intended” 
language in the definition of an “occurrence” as an exclusion,9 in 1986 the 
language was formally moved to the exclusions section of CGL policies:  “This 
insurance does not apply to . . . ‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected 
or intended from the standpoint of the insured. . . .”10  This move, however, did 
not change the analysis of whether there has been an occurrence.  The 
question to be answered still remains whether the policyholder did 
something that resulted in property damage or bodily injury that the 
policyholder did not expect or intend to cause.11
  
C. The “Business Risk” Exclusions 
Under ISO’s 1973 CGL policy form, there were three exclusions 
commonly referred to as the “business risk” exclusions, which purport to 
 8.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (1986), supra note 2, app. B, § V(9), at 277; Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form 
No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (2007), supra note 2, 
app. J, § V(13), at 479. 
 9.  See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1994 WL 1029337, at *9 (W.D. 
Mich. July 22, 1994) (“[A]lthough the neither expected nor intended language appears in the 
occurrence clause, it essentially operates as an exclusion.”); Clemco Indus. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 820-21 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (determining that the “expected 
or intended” language is an exclusionary clause, and thus requires a narrow interpretation to 
provide the insured the greatest protection); Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 
Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307, 311 n.3 (N.D. 1990) (“A determination of coverage under the 
‘expected or intended’ language in the definition of an occurrence generally involves the 
same determination as coverage under an exclusion for intentional acts.” (citing James L. 
Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability 
Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 
A.L.R.4th 957, 971 (1984))). 
 10.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (1986), supra note 2, app. B, § I(2)(a), at 269; Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form 
No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (2007), supra note 2, 
app. J, § I(2)(a) at 467. 
 11.  See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL,
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE §6.03[B][1] (1st ed. 1997 & 
Supp. 2009) (“Most jurisdictions follow the rule that only expected or intended injury, as 
opposed to expected or intended acts, can preclude coverage.”).  See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 883 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]hese policies provide coverage not only 
for ‘accidental events,’ but also injuries or damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 
of the insured.”); Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 520 (W. Va. 2013) (“In 
determining whether under a liability insurance policy an occurrence was or was not an ‘accident’—
or was or was not deliberate, intentional, expected, desired, or foreseen—primary consideration, 
relevance, and weight should ordinarily be given to the perspective or standpoint of the insured 
whose coverage under the policy is at issue.” (citing Columbia Cas. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 617 
S.E.2d 797 (W. Va. 2005))). 
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eliminate coverage for certain risks inherent in doing business.12  They were 
worded as follows: 
This [insurance] does not apply . . . : 
(n)  to property damage to the named insured’s products arising 
out of such products or any part of such products; 
(o)  to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the 
named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or 
out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection 
therewith; 
(p)  to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair, 
replacement, or loss of use of the named insured’s products or 
work completed by or for the named insured or of any property 
of which such products or work form a part, if such products, 
work or property are withdrawn from the market or from use 
because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency 
therein . . . .13
Since 1973, the business risk exclusions have been redrafted to narrow the 
scope of the exclusions.14  Beginning in 1976, policyholders could purchase 
what was commonly referred to as a Broad Form Property Endorsement that 
replaced, among other exclusions, Exclusion (o) with an exclusion that expanded 
coverage.15
In 1986, the business risk exclusions were revised again to incorporate the 
Broad Form Property Endorsement into the policy itself, clarify the language in 
the business risk exclusions, and add an exception for work done by 
subcontractors.16  Since 1986, the business risk exclusions have been worded as 
follows: 
This insurance does not apply to . . . : 
k.  Damage to Your Product 
 12.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Comprehensive General 
Liability Insurance Coverage Form (1973), supra note 2, app. A, § I(n)-(p), at 262. 
 13.  Id.
 14.  See 21 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 132.9[B], at 
148-50 (2002) (commenting on the changes as limiting the availability of previous 
exclusions to insurance coverage). 
 15.  See id. (replacing exclusions (k) and (o) with “Broad Form Property Damage 
Liability Coverage” that narrows the previous business risk exclusions to insurance 
coverage).
 16.  See id. § 132.9[C]-[D], at 150-53 (“Because the term ‘your work’ is an integral part 
of the 1986 Damage to ‘Your Work’ Exception ‘l,’ the term ‘your work’ must be 
understood.  Part V of the 1986 CGL provides the following definition: ‘Your work’ means: 
a. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and b. Materials, parts or 
equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.”).  For more on the new 
language, see Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General 
Liability Coverage Form (1986), supra note 2, app. B, § I(2)(k)-(m), at 270-71. 
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“Property damage” to “your product” arising out of it or any part 
of it. 
l.  Damage to Your Work 
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of 
it and included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”  
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work 
out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by 
a subcontractor. 
m.  Damage to Impaired Property or Property Not Physically 
Injured
“Property damage” to “impaired property” or property that has 
not been physically injured, arising out of: 
(1)  A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in 
“your product” or “your work”; or 
(2)  A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to 
perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms.  
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property 
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to “your 
product” or “your work” after it has been put to its intended use.17
According to one commentator, the subcontractor exception was added 
because:
[T]he insurance and policyholder communities agreed that the 
CGL policy should provide coverage for defective construction 
claims so long as the allegedly defective work had been 
performed by a subcontractor rather than the policyholder itself.  
This resulted both because of the demands of the policyholder 
community (which wanted this sort of coverage) and the view of 
insurers that the CGL was a more attractive product that could be 
better sold if it contained this coverage.18
ISO itself, through a July 15, 1986 circular, stated that the 1986 revisions to 
the business risk exclusions were intended to incorporate the 1976 Broad Form 
Property Endorsement and to make it clear that the policy “cover[ed] damage 
caused by faulty workmanship to other parts of work in progress; and damage to, 
or caused by, a subcontractor’s work after the insured’s operations are 
completed.”19
 17.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (1986), supra note 2, app. B, § I(2)(k)-(m), at 270-71. 
 18.  2 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 14.13[D], at 14-
224.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2007). 
 19.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 (Fla. 2007) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Circular No. GL-86-204, Commercial General 
Liability Program Instructions Pamphlet (1986)).
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II. THE RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
When courts are asked to interpret and apply policy language, such as the 
definitions of “occurrence” and “property damage,” there are three well-
established rules of policy interpretation that are particularly relevant:  (1) contra
proferentem, (2) the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, and (3) construction of 
the policy as a whole. 
A. Contra Proferentem 
As drafters of the policy language, the doctrine of contra proferentem
applies, which means any ambiguities in the policy language are construed 
against the insurers and in favor of coverage.20  For determining whether policy 
language is ambiguous, the test under many states’ laws is whether the 
provisions at issue are reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpretations 
or meanings.21  If the policyholder and insurer both offer reasonable 
interpretations of the policy language, then the policy language is 
ambiguous and should be construed in favor of coverage.22  Stated 
 20.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981)(“In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally 
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing 
otherwise proceeds.”). See also Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of 
Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1121 n.64 (2006) (“The language of a 
contract will be construed most strictly or strongly against the party responsible for its 
use . . . .”) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts §337 (2003))); Ethan J. Leib & Steve Thel, Contra
Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 774 
n.4 (2015) (“[T]he contra proferentem rule is followed in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, and with good reason.  Insurance policies are almost always drafted by 
specialists employed by the insurer.  In light of the drafters’ expertise and experience, the 
insurer should be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a 
common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take 
advantage of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater diligence.” 
(quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (1990))).
 21.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 531, 537 (1996) (noting that the first inquiry courts make to determine the 
ambiguity of a disputed policy provision is whether it is “reasonably susceptible to two 
meanings.”). See also New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in 
controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two 
or more different meanings.” (quoting New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1999))); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 
(N.J. 1992) (“When a policy fairly supports an interpretation favorable to both the insured 
and the insurer, the policy should be interpreted in favor of the insured.”).  
 22.  In addition to supra note 21, see High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 
648 A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably may be 
interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists 
in the policy that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”).
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differently, contra proferentum applies even if the insurer’s interpretation 
is more reasonable than the policyholder’s so long as the policyholder’s 
interpretation is also reasonable.23  Where the controversy involves a phrase 
that insurers have failed to define and has generated many lawsuits with 
inconsistent rulings by courts, common sense suggests the policy language 
must be ambiguous – i.e., susceptible to multiple reasonable 
interpretations.24
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine 
Another staple of insurance policy interpretation is that insurance 
policies should be interpreted in such a way as to fulfill the “reasonable 
expectations” of the policyholder.25  The seminal article regarding the 
 23.  Along with supra note 21, see Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 
504, 506 (Tex. App. 1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary 
clause urged by the insured as long as that construction is not unreasonable, even if the 
construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate 
reflection of the parties’ intent.”).
 24.  See, e.g., Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1122-23 (“‘[T]he mere 
fact that several . . . courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying coverage, and 
several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing almost identical policy 
provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible 
to more than one interpretation,” and is therefore ambiguous.” (quoting Little v. MGIC 
Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1987))); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Investors 
Diversified Ltd., Inc., 407 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance 
company contends that the language is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as 
proof of that pudding the fact that the Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in 
New Orleans have arrived at opposite conclusions from a study of essentially the same 
language.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan. 1989) (The 
“reported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached different 
conclusions and the justices of this court [disagree]. . . . Under such circumstances, the 
clause is, by definition, ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1958) (“Since we assume that all courts adopt a reasonable construction, the conflict is of 
itself indicative that the word as so used is susceptible of at least two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation at hand.”); George H. 
Olmsted & Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276 (Ohio 1928) (“Where the 
language of a clause used in an insurance contract is such that courts of numerous 
jurisdictions have found it necessary to construe it and in such construction have arrived at 
conflicting conclusions as to the correct meaning, intent and effect thereof, the question 
whether such clause is ambiguous ceases to be an open one.”); Cohen v. Erie Indem, Co., 
432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact that. . . [courts differ on the 
construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in 
issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES §§ 6.3(a)(3), at 
633-34 (student ed. 1988) (discussing the reasonable expectations doctrine as applied by 
courts); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
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“reasonable expectations” doctrine was written more than forty years ago 
by then Professor Robert Keeton.26  In his subsequent treatise, then Judge 
Keeton summarized the doctrine as follows:  “In general, courts will 
protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds, and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even 
though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such 
expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer.”27  In 
other words, under Judge Keeton’s view of the reasonable expectations 
DISPUTES §1.03[b][2][B], at 35-46 (14th ed. 2008) (identifying courts in forty-two states that 
have expressed support for, or applied a form of, the reasonable expectations doctrine); 
STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 4.09[C], at 4-110 to -112 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (presenting 
different arguments that justify the reasonable expectations approach). See also AIU Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (noting that ambiguous coverage 
clauses of insurance policies are to be interpreted broadly to protect the objectively 
reasonable expectations of the insured); Roland v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 
S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“[a] contract of insurance should be strictly construed against 
the insurer and read in favor of coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of 
the insured”); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1995) 
(“the policy language must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the 
insured’s reasonable expectations”); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 
S.E.2d 488, 495-96 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that courts will apply the reasonable 
expectations doctrine to construe the policy in a manner that “a reasonable person standing 
in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean,” even though painstaking 
examination of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 26.  See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (defining and providing the basic reasoning underlying 
the “reasonable expectations” doctrine). 
 27.  KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, § 6.3(a)(3), at 633.  For commentary regarding 
the reasonable expectations doctrine and its various iterations, see Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the 
doctrine is principled and can be applied within justifiable guidelines); Robert H. Jerry, II, 
Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 
(1998) (discussing the doctrine as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. Mayhew, 
Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287-96 
(1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable
Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements to 
the doctrine in response to the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and 
commentators, and contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to 
speak the platitudes of reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic 
analysis”); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of 
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2007) (criticizing the reasonable 
expectations doctrine and arguing that the case law endorsing the doctrine is “confused and 
inconsistent”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the 
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 182-83, 191-95 (1998) (describing the various judicial approaches to 
the doctrine and noting both liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that 
have adopted the doctrine).
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doctrine, “even when the policy language unambiguously precludes 
coverage, under certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage 
exists.”28  In short, the policyholder should receive the coverage that it 
reasonably expected it would receive when it bought the policy even if 
there is some policy language or exclusion that arguably defeats coverage 
for the claim. 
C. Construction of the Policy as a Whole 
The third rule of insurance policy interpretation applicable to the issue of 
whether construction defects are occurrences provides that, if possible, the policy 
should be interpreted in a way that reconciles the various provisions of the policy 
and attempts to give effect to all of the policy’s provisions.29  In essence, this rule 
instructs courts to attempt to interpret all of a policy’s provisions in a way that is 
consistent with the general purpose of the policy as a whole.  This means that the 
definition of “occurrence” should not be read in isolation in determining whether 
a claim is covered.  Instead, the definition of “occurrence,” as well as the rest of 
the policy provisions including the business risk exclusions, should be 
interpreted together to determine whether the policy covers the claim at issue. 
D. The Rules of Policy Interpretations and the “Expected or 
Intended” Exclusion 
In analyzing whether construction defects are “accidents,” several questions 
arise with respect to the “expected or intended” language contained in CGL 
policies, regardless of whether the phrase is located in the definition of 
“occurrence” or in the exclusions section of the policy.  What must be expected 
or intended by the policyholder in order for the exclusion to apply – the 
 28.  Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims,
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 22 (1997). 
 29.  See, e.g., Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 
1985) (applying New York law and stating “an interpretation that gives a reasonable and 
effective meaning to all the terms of a contract is generally preferred to one that leaves a 
part unreasonable or of no effect”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 155-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“In short, an insurance contract is to be construed in 
a manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical 
manner, having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire 
contract.” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 266 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990))); Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1974) 
(explaining that the provisions of an insurance policy should be interpreted in the context of 
the entire policy); Welborn v. Ill. Nat’l Cas. Co., 106 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) 
(“[T]he court should determine the intention [of the parties] from the whole agreement, and 
endeavor to give a meaning to all provisions, so far as possible, which will render them 
consistent and operative.”). 
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policyholder’s actions or the resulting property damage or injury?  Should the 
court or jury consider the policyholder’s intentions and expectations from a 
subjective or an objective point of view? 
In answering these questions, it is important to remember that the “expected 
or intended” language acts as an exclusion regardless of where it is found in 
CGL policies.30  As an exclusion, the rules of policy interpretation dictate that it 
should be narrowly construed31 with all ambiguities resolved in favor of the 
policyholder.32  Further, as an exclusion, the insurer has the burden of proving it 
applies.33
1. The Resulting Damage, Not the Act Itself, Must Be Expected or 
Intended
So, what must be expected or intended for the policyholder to lose coverage 
– the act that causes the injury or damage or the injury or damage itself?  
Generally speaking, the policyholder typically intends to engage in the conduct 
at issue, such as the construction work, that gives rise to the damage.  Thus, what 
exactly must the policyholder expect or intend before the claim is excluded from 
coverage?  The majority rule is that the injury or damage must be expected or 
intended, not the act giving rise to the injury or damage.34
 30.  See supra note 9 (collecting cases in which the court treats the “expected or 
intended” language in “occurrence” as an exclusion).
 31.  See, e.g., Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that policy provision excluding acts explicitly covered in prior section of 
policy are construed against insurer); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668, 
672 (Nev. 2011) (“While clauses providing coverage are interpreted broadly so as to afford 
the greatest possible coverage to the insured, clauses excluding coverage are interpreted 
narrowly against the insurer.” (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. Reno’s Exec. Air, 682 P.2d 
1380, 1383 (Nev. 1984))).
 32.  See supra Part II.A. (discussing the doctrine of contra proferentem, which resolves 
ambiguities in favor of coverage and against the insurer).
 33.  See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) 
(stating that the insurer has burden to prove the applicability of an exclusion as an 
affirmative defense); United Rental Equip. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 376 A.2d 
1183, 1187 (N.J. 1977) (“When an insurance carrier puts in issue its coverage of a loss 
under a contract of insurance by relying on an exclusionary clause, it bears a substantial 
burden of demonstrating that the loss falls outside the scope of coverage.”); Cont’l Ins. Co. 
v. Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 415 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ohio 1980) (stating that the insurer has the 
burden of proof for a defense that is based upon an exclusion); Brown v. Snohomish Cnty. 
Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 340 (Wash. 1993) (noting that once the policyholder has 
made a prima facie case that there is coverage, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove an 
exclusionary provision applies).
 34.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985) (explaining that the intentional injury exclusion applied only where the insured 
intended both an act causing damage and the results of that act); Hanover Ins. Co. v. 
Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689, 690 (Mass. 1992) (“The focus in these cases is whether the 
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A minority of courts interpreted the language to mean that if any injury or 
damage is expected or intended, then coverage is lost even if the injury or 
damage that resulted was different than what the policyholder expected or 
intended.35  Other courts held that coverage is not precluded if the policyholder 
expected an injury or damage that was different than, or significantly less severe 
than, what actually occurred.36  The latter approach is more consistent with the 
rule that exclusions should be interpreted narrowly with any ambiguities 
resolved in favor of coverage. 
insured ‘intended’ the injury, not whether the insured ‘intended’ the act.”); White v. Smith, 
440 S.W.2d 497, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (explaining that, although some damages are 
foreseeable, “damages not intentionally inflicted but resulting from an insured’s 
negligence . . . may be caused by accident and within the coverage afforded by a liability 
insurance policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 
609 N.E.2d 506, 510 (N.Y. 1993) (“Resulting damage can be unintended even though the 
act leading to the damage was intentional.  A person may engage in behavior that involves a 
calculated risk without expecting that an accident will occur.” (citations omitted)); Grand 
River Lime Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) 
(recognizing that the term occurrence is broader than the term “accident” and may 
encompass a fully intended action that resulted in unintended damage); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 420-21 (S.C. 1994) (explaining that an intentional injury 
exclusion did not bar coverage where the insured had not intended the injury resulting from 
his voluntary act). 
 35.  See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 438, 439 (Colo.  
App. 2006) (explaining that the intentional act exclusion applies “whenever some injury is 
intended, even though the injury that actually results differs in character or degree from the 
injury actually intended.” (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 
816 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1991))); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 939 (Colo. App. 1976) 
(holding in an assault case that where the insured “intentionally struck the plaintiff, he must 
be deemed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actions” and thus “it 
is immaterial that the particular injury that resulted was not specifically intended.”); Georgia 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purvis, 444 S.E.2d 109, 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding 
that an intentional act exclusion is applicable where “the insured acts with the intent or 
expectation that . . . injury occur, even if the actual, resulting injury is different either in 
kind or magnitude from that intended or expected.” (quoting Stein v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 
324 S.E.2d 510, 511-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985))); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 466 
N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (“Once intended harm is established, 
the fact of an unintended injury is irrelevant.”); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Kment, 
658 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Neb. 2003) (“In order for the intentional or expected injury exclusion 
in a liability insurance policy to apply, the insurer must show that the insured acted with the 
specific intent to cause harm to a third party, but does not have to show that the insured 
intended the specific injury that occurred.”). 
 36.  See, e.g., Yount v. Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148, 152 (La. 1993) (“[W]hen minor injury 
is intended, and a substantially greater or more severe injury results, whether by chance, 
coincidence, accident, or whatever, coverage for the more severe injury is not barred.” 
(quoting Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. 1989))); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n 
v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“Our interpretation affords maximum 
coverage to insured persons as coverage is precluded only for harm of the same general type 
as that which they set out to inflict.”). 
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2. Objective v. Subjective Standard 
When analyzing the policyholder’s intentions and expectations, should a 
subjective or an objective standard be used?  The clear majority rule is that the 
insurer must prove that the policyholder subjectively expected or intended to 
cause the injury or damage, as opposed to objectively should have expected or 
intended to cause the injury damage at issue.37
In the minority of jurisdictions that apply an objective standard, there are a 
few variations of the test.  Under one variation, the question is whether a 
“reasonable” person would have expected the injury at issue.38  Under another 
 37.  Compare U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985) 
(“[T]he legal standard to determine whether the injury was either expected or intended . . . is 
a purely subjective standard.”), and Fire Ins. Exch. v. Berray, 694 P.2d 191, 194 (Ariz. 
1984) (explaining that the court looks “from the standpoint of the insured” to determine 
whether the insured “expected or intended” to cause injury), and Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur 
Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the objective 
“should have known” meaning of “expect” and instead adopting the word’s “plain 
meaning”), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 P.2d 785, 794 (Colo. 
1996) (rejecting the insurer’s “objective viewpoint” argument and addressing the issue from 
the viewpoint of the insured), and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 
1992) (“[T]he subjective intent of the insured is the key and not what the average or 
ordinary reasonable person would expect or intend.”), and Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Abernathy, 469 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Mass. 1984) (“Our cases have concluded that an injury is 
nonaccidental only where the result was actually, not constructively, intended . . . .”), and
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 892 (Me. 1981) (adopting a 
subjective standard and recognizing it as the majority standard), and Espinet v. Horvath, 597 
A.2d 307, 309 (Vt. 1991) (upholding a subjective standard and rejecting the use of an 
objective standard with respect to “inherently dangerous activity” where such activity was 
not explicitly excluded by the insurance policy), and Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l 
Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d 703, 714 (Wash. 1994) (holding that a subjective standard 
applies), and Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 807 (W. 
Va. 2001) (“[C]ourts must use a subjective rather than objective standard for determining 
the policyholder’s intent.”), with City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 
1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979) (using an objective standard of “knew or should have known” 
in determining if a result was “expected”), and In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. 
Supp. 1293, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“Texas law determines an insured’s intention 
‘objectively’ and not ‘subjectively.’”). See also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 25, 
§ 8.03[c], at 496-501 (12th ed. 2004) (discussing the objective “reasonable man” standard 
with regard to expectation and intendment).
 38.  See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(“[I]n determining whether the damages were expected under the terms of the policy the 
appropriate standard to be applied is an objective one, i.e., whether a reasonable man in the 
position of the insured would have expected the damage to occur.”); City of Carter Lake,
604 F.2d at 1059 (asking, for purposes of determining coverage, “[i]f the insured knew or 
should have known that there was a substantial probability that certain results would follow 
his acts or omissions . . . .”); In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. Supp. at 1321 
(applying Texas law and explaining that the objective standard focuses on “what the insured 
knew or should have known.”).  More discussions can be found in OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
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variation, the question is whether the policyholder knew or should have known 
that there was a “substantial probability” his or her actions would result in the 
injury at issue.39  “Substantial probability” has been defined as whether “a 
reasonably prudent man” would be aware that the adverse “results are highly 
likely to occur.”40
In order for a court to adopt an objective standard, it must ignore the actual 
policy language that expressly states a subjective standard applies.41
Specifically, the “expected or intended” exclusion provides that, in order for the 
policyholder to lose coverage, the injury or damage must be “expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”42  The exclusion does not state that 
coverage is lost if a “reasonable” person would have expected or intended the 
resulting injury or damage.  Nor does it state that coverage is lost if the 
policyholder should have known there was a “substantial probability” or a “high 
likelihood” that the injury or damage would result. 
Further, a “should have known” standard would eliminate coverage for 
many negligence claims because many accidents are reasonably foreseeable.  
Eliminating coverage for negligence claims would be inconsistent with one of 
the primary purposes of liability insurance.  In the words of Justice Cardozo, 
“[t]o restrict insurance to cases where liability is incurred without fault of the 
insured would reduce indemnity to a shadow.”43  Or, as stated by the Second 
supra note 25, § 8.03[c], at 496-501 (12th ed. 2004). 
 39.  See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 25, § 8.03[c], at 496 – 497 (12th ed. 2004) 
(reviewing judicial precedent to establish the meaning of “substantial probability”).  
 40.  City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4.  See also King v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between standards of 
“reasonably foreseeable” and “substantial probability” and expressing, “the latter requires 
not only that a reasonably prudent person would be alerted to the possibility of results 
occurring, but that such a reasonable person would be forewarned that the results are ‘highly 
likely to occur.’” (quoting City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4)). 
 41.  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dichtl, 398 N.E.2d 582, 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(rejecting insurance company’s argument to read in a “reasonableness standard,” noting that 
if the insurer, who drafted the policy language, “wanted an objective standard to apply, it 
could have drafted its policy accordingly.”); James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991) (“[P]olicies do not define 
‘expected’ and ‘intended’ but those are common words and they clearly indicate subjective 
awareness.”); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(explaining that the common meaning of “expected” “connote[s] an element of conscious 
awareness on the part of the insured.”). 
 42.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (2007), supra note 2, app. J, § I(2)(a), at 467 (emphasis added). 
 43.  Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432, 432 (N.Y. 1921).  Employing an 
objective standard to exclude coverage for negligence claims arguably would also be 
inconsistent with the reasonable expectations doctrine. See, e.g., United Servs., 517 A.2d at 
991 (“We do not believe that a layman would reasonably expect that as a result of the 
inclusion of such a phrase [i.e., “expected or intended”] in his insurance contract he might 
not be insured for negligent acts.  These are the very acts which insurance is purchased to 
2016] REVISITING CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS 117 
Circuit sixty years later, “to exclude all losses or damages which might in some 
way have been expected by the insured, could expand the field of exclusion until 
virtually no recovery could be had on insurance.”44
Consequently, the majority view is that a subjective standard should be 
applied.45  Under this approach, the actual intent of the policyholder is examined 
rather that what some fictitious “reasonable person” knew or should have 
foreseen.  Thus, coverage is only precluded where the insurer can prove the 
policyholder actually expected or intended to cause the damage at issue. 
III. THE COURTS’ APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS ARE OCCURRENCES
A. The Seminal Weedo Case 
Historically, the seminal case regarding the issue of whether construction 
defects are covered under CGL policies is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1979 
opinion in Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.46  In Weedo, a subcontractor was hired 
to pour a concrete floor on a veranda and to apply stucco to the exterior of a 
home.47  Soon after the job was completed, cracks in the stucco appeared and 
“other signs of faulty workmanship” manifested such that the homeowner had to 
replace the stucco.48  The homeowner sued the contractor, and the contractor 
tendered the claim to its CGL insurer.49  The insurer denied coverage on the basis 
that CGL policies allegedly do not cover claims for faulty workmanship.50
The CGL policy at issue stated that the insurer agreed to pay “on behalf of 
the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of * * * bodily injury * * * or property damage to which this 
insurance applies, caused by an occurrence * * * .”51  The policy also contained 
the 1973 standard form business risk exclusions: 
This insurance does not apply: 
protect against.”). 
 44.  City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 
1989). See also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 735 n.6 (Minn. 
1997) (rejecting a “purely objective test” because it is inconsistent with the prior 
interpretations of the term “unexpected” and would “undermine coverage for injuries caused 
by simple negligence, a result we sought to avoid in prior cases.”). 
 45.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text (reviewing judicial precedent throughout 
the states and determining that a majority of state courts use the subjective standard when 
determining intent).  
 46.  405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979). 
 47.  Id. at 789. 
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id.
 51.  Id. at 790. 
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(n)  to property damage to the named insured’s products arising 
out of such products or any part of such products; 
(o)  to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the 
named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or 
out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection 
therewith.52
 In rejecting the contractor’s claim for coverage, the court reasoned: 
Regardless of the existence of express warranties, the insured’s 
provision of stucco and stone “generally carries with it an 
implied warranty of merchantability and often an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.” . . . Where the work 
performed by the insured-contractor is faulty, either express or 
implied warranties, or both, are breached.  As a matter of contract 
law the customer did not obtain that for which he bargained . . . . 
[A] principal justification for imposing warranties by operation 
of law on contractors is that these parties are often “in a better 
position to prevent the occurrence of major problems” in the 
course of constructing a home than is the homeowner . . . . The 
consequence of not performing well is part of every business 
venture; the replacement or repair of faulty goods and works is a 
business expense, to be borne by the insured-contractor in order 
to satisfy customers.53
To support its decision, the court cited to and relied on a 1971 law review 
article by a law professor at the University of Nebraska, Roger C. Henderson, 
regarding the changes made in 1966 to the standard CGL policy form with 
respect to the business risk exclusions for products liability and completed 
operations.54  In particular, the court quoted the portion of the article in which 
Professor Henderson opined: 
“The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the goods, 
products or work of the insured, once relinquished or completed, 
will cause bodily injury or damage to property other than to the 
product or completed work itself, and for which the insured may 
be found liable.”55
The court also pointed to the business risk exclusions in the policy at issue 
in the case and stated that “given the precise and limited form of damages 
which form the basis of the claims against the insured, either exclusion is, 
 52.  Id. at 792. 
 53.  Id. at 790-91 (citations omitted).  
54. Id. (citing Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and 
Completed Operations – What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 418, 441 
(1971)).
 55.  Id. at 791 (quoting Henderson, supra note 54, at 441). 
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or both are, applicable to exclude coverage.  In short, the indemnity sought 
is not for ‘property damage to which this insurance applies.’”56
For numerous reasons, the Weedo decision is obsolete and of little value 
today in analyzing whether construction defects can constitute occurrences.  
One, the court did not analyze the definition of “occurrence” in the policy at 
issue and did not even address whether the faulty stucco work constituted an 
occurrence.57  Two, the court did not analyze the definition of “property damage” 
in the policy at issue and did not address whether the faulty stucco work was 
property damage or caused property damage.58  Three, Professor Henderson’s 
law review article, on which the court relied, did not analyze or address the 
issues of whether construction defects constitute occurrences or property 
damage.59  Instead, Professor Henderson’s article focused on the business risk 
exclusions contained in the 1966 CGL policy form, and he then offered his own 
unsupported conclusions regarding the intent of the exclusions.60  Four, as 
discussed in Part I.C., the business risk exclusions at issue in the case were 
redrafted in 1986 to provide much narrower reductions in coverage than the 
earlier versions of such exclusions.  Thus, Professor Henderson’s 1971 law 
review article and the Weedo decision itself are of little value today in 
understanding or applying the current business risk exclusions or determining 
whether construction defects can constitute occurrences. 
Following the 1986 changes to the business risk exclusions, one would 
expect that the Weedo decision and Professor Henderson’s 1971 law review 
article would be cited by courts only as a historical note regarding the evolution 
of the policy language and law in this area.  Surprisingly, however, as is 
discussed in Part III.C below, the Weedo decision and Professor Henderson’s 
article continue to be relied upon by some courts from time to time, particularly 
in decisions where the court misinterprets the issue before it.61
Weedo’s enduring legacy, however, may finally be at an end.  On August 4, 
2016, the New Jersey Supreme Court effectively overruled Weedo in Cypress 
Point Condominium Assoc. v. Adria Towers, LLC.62  In Cypress Point, a 
 56.  Id. at 792 (quoting George H. Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance 
– Perspective and Overview, 25 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 233 (1975)). 
 57.  See id. at 790 n.2 (explaining that the court would not address whether, in light of 
the policy’s stated exclusions, coverage extended to the claims at issue, because the insurer 
had already conceded that “but for the exclusions in the policy, coverage would obtain.”). 
 58.  See id. at 790, 792 (only briefly addressing that there were no allegations that the 
work caused additional property damage). 
 59.  For more information, see Henderson, supra note 54. 
 60.  Id. at 438-41 (advancing Professor Henderson’s opinion that “[t]he insurance 
industry evidently feels that the risks of bodily injury or property damage arising from the 
planning stage of business are a business risk of the insured.”).  
 61.  See, e.g., Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 n.10 (Pa. 2006) (citing to Henderson’s article). 
 62.  143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016).  
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condominium association sued a developer, the developer’s subcontractors, and 
the developer’s insurers regarding allegedly faulty workmanship with respect to, 
among other things, the installation of the roof, gutters, windows, and doors.63
The allegedly defective work was done by subcontractors.64  The allegedly faulty 
workmanship caused damage to common areas and unit owners’ property, 
including damage to steel supports, drywall, and insulation.65
The CGL policy at issue was a standard form ISO policy that defined 
“occurrence” and “property damage” as set forth above in Part I.B.66  The 
developer was not seeking coverage for the cost to repair the allegedly defective 
workmanship, but rather, only for the consequential damages caused by the 
defective workmanship.67  Nonetheless, the insurers denied coverage on the 
ground that there was no “property damage” or an “occurrence” that was 
covered under the policy on the basis of Weedo.68
The trial court agreed with the insurers and granted summary judgment in 
their favor.69  On appeal, the intermediate appellate court distinguished Weedo
and then reversed the trial court’s ruling, concluding “consequential damages 
caused by the subcontractors’ defective work constitute[d] ‘property damage’ 
and an ‘occurrence’ under the polic[ies].”70
In affirming the intermediate appellate court’s ruling, the New Jersey 
Supreme court held, “the consequential damages caused by the subcontractors’ 
faulty workmanship constitute ‘property damage,’ and the event resulting in that 
damage – water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the 
subcontractors’ faulty workmanship – is an ‘occurrence’ under the plain 
language of the CGL policies at issue here.”71  In reaching its holding, the court 
noted there were a number of differences between the 1973 CGL policy form at 
issue in Weedo and the policy form at issue in the case before it, including the 
subcontractor exception to the business risk exclusions, which the New Jersey 
Supreme Court previously had not considered.72  The court also noted that the 
Weedo court had not addressed the issues of whether construction defects could 
constitute “occurrences” or cause “property damage” because the Weedo court 
based its ruling on the 1973 business risk exclusions that were replaced in 
 63.  Id. at 276-77. 
 64.  Id. at 276. 
 65.  Id. at 277.
 66.  Id. at 276-77. 
 67.  Id. at 277. 
 68.  Id. at 278. 
 69.  Id.
 70.  Id. at 278 (quoting Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, LLC., 118 
A.3d 1080, 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2015)) (brackets omitted). 
 71.  Id. at 276. 
 72.  Id. at 281-82. 
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1986.73  The court also reviewed the existing non-New Jersey case law on the 
issues, which “represent ‘a strong recent trend in the case law [of most federal 
circuit and state courts] interpet[ing] the term “occurrence” to encompass 
unanticipated damage to nondefective property resulting from poor 
workmanship.’”74  The court then concluded that damage caused by defective 
workmanship is “property damage:” 
[P]ost-construction consequential damages resulted in loss of use 
of the affected areas by [the Policyholder] residents and, we hold, 
qualify as “[p]hysical injury to tangible property including all 
resulting loss of use of that property.”  Therefore, on the record 
before us, the consequential damages to [the Policyholder] were 
covered “property damage” under the terms of the policies.75
With respect to the issue of whether construction defects could be 
“occurrences,” the court concluded: 
[T]he insurers’ argument fails to recognize that Weedo and its 
progeny were decided based upon exclusions contained within 
the pre-1986 CGL policy, rather than an interpretation of the 
policy’s terms granting coverage in the first instance . . . . In any 
event, under our interpretation of the term “occurrence” in the 
policies, consequential harm caused by negligent work is an 
“accident.”  Therefore, because the result of the subcontractors’ 
faulty workmanship here – consequential water damage to the 
completed and nondefective portions of Cypress Point – was an 
“accident,” it is an “occurrence” under the policies and is 
therefore covered so long as the other parameters set by the 
policies are met.76
In sum, although the New Jersey Supreme Court may not have expressly 
overruled Weedo, it is questionable whether the Weedo decision has any 
remaining precedential value in New Jersey, and it is generally an obsolete 
decision with respect to the current CGL policy forms. 
B. The Current State of the Law 
When I originally addressed this subject in December 2011,77 there was a 
split among the courts regarding whether construction defects do or can 
 73.  Id. at 283. 
 74.  Id. at 285 (citation omitted). 
 75.  Id. at 286. 
 76.  Id. at 288-89. 
 77.  See French, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that state courts varied in their holdings 
regarding the issue of whether construction defects can be “occurrences”). 
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constitute occurrences, with an emerging majority position that they do.78  In the 
 78.  For further discussion, see French, supra note 1, at 24-27. Compare Am. Empire 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 2011) (“[A]n 
occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or unexpected damage to 
other property.”), and Architex Ass’n, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 
(Miss. 2010) (“[T]he term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude 
coverage for unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or 
conduct of a subcontractor, unless otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after 
loss.”), and U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 885 (Fla. 2007) (concluding 
defective soil work done by a subcontractor that caused damage to homes was an occurrence 
under CGL policies), and Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 
S.W.3d 302, 310 (Tenn. 2007) (“[D]efective installation [of windows] resulted in water 
penetration . . . [and] constitute[d] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the CGL.”), and
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) (concluding 
that damage to the insured’s work, as well as damage to a third party’s property, can result 
from an occurrence as defined in the CGL policy, but that no basis exists in the definition of 
occurrence to distinguish between the two), and Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 137 P.3d 486, 493 (Kan. 2006) (“[D]amage occurring as a result of faulty or negligent 
workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not intend for the damage 
to occur.”), and Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Wis. 2004) 
(holding that excessive settlement of soil, which occurred after the building was completed, 
and which caused the building’s foundation to sink, was ‘“property damage’ caused by an 
‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the CGL policies’ general grant of coverage”), and
Corner Const. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 N.W.2d 887, 894-85 (S.D. 2002) 
(construction defects resulting in ventilation problems constituted an accident that was 
covered by the policy at issue), and Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 522-23 (Alaska 
1999) (improper or faulty workmanship constitutes an accident because “[w]e have defined 
the term ‘accident’ as ‘anything that begins to be, that happens, or that is a result which is 
not anticipated and is unforeseen and unexpected’”), and High Country Assocs. v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (finding that property damage to 
condominium units caused by defective workmanship was an occurrence within the 
meaning of the CGL policy), and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 
N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that damage to a building caused by installation of 
asbestos was a covered occurrence), and Joe Banks Drywall & Acoustics, Inc. v. Transcon. 
Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 980, 983 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000) (finding that improper or faulty 
workmanship constitutes an occurrence within the meaning of a general commercial liability 
policy), and Erie Ins. Exch. v. Colony Dev. Corp., 736 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999) (“[W]e find that the [insured’s] allegations of property damage caused by [the 
contractor’s] negligence in constructing and designing the condominium complex 
reasonably fall within the policy’s definition of property damage caused by an ‘occurrence,’ 
— i.e., an accident.”), with Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Const., Inc., 383 F.3d 
940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Hawaiian law and explaining that “[g]eneral liability 
policies . . . are not designated to provide contractors and developers with coverage against 
claims their work is inferior or defective” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Lenning 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 583 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Kentucky law 
and declaring “there is no ‘occurrence’ to the extent that [a] complaint alleges property 
damage arising out of defective or faulty craftsmanship”), and J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. King, 987 
F.2d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New York law for the proposition that “mere faulty 
workmanship, standing alone, cannot constitute an occurrence” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33, 40-42 (N.D. 2006) 
(concluding that damages to a roof that a contractor was replacing were excluded from 
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past five years, however, there has been near unanimity by the courts that have 
addressed the issue. They have held that construction defects can constitute 
occurrences and contractors have coverage under CGL policies at least for the 
unexpected property damage caused by defective workmanship done by 
subcontractors.79  Currently, the supreme courts of the states of Alabama,80
coverage because to hold otherwise would convert the policy into a performance bond, but 
damages resulting from a defective roof to the apartment interior was covered under the 
policy), and Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an 
‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty 
workmanship.”), and L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33, 37 
(S.C. 2005) (finding that “faulty workmanship does not constitute an ‘occurrence’”), and
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571, 578 (Neb. 2004) 
(“[A]lthough a standard CGL policy does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship that 
damages only the resulting work product, if faulty workmanship causes bodily injury or 
property damage to something other than the insured’s work product, an unintended and 
unexpected event has occurred, and coverage exists.”), and Corder v. William W. Smith 
Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 83 (W. Va. 2001) (“[C]ommercial general liability policies 
are not designed to cover poor workmanship.”), and Oak Crest Const. Co. v. Austin Mut. 
Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Or. 2000) (“[T]here can be no ‘accident,’ within the meaning 
of a commercial liability policy, when the resulting damage is merely a breach of 
contract.”), and Pursell Const., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 
1999) (“[D]efective workmanship standing alone, that is, resulting in damages only to the 
work product itself, is not an occurrence under a CGL policy.”), and Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. 
of Ariz. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[C]laims 
of poor workmanship, standing alone, are not occurrences that trigger coverage under CGL 
policies similar to those at issue here.”), and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 
N.E.2d 986, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Where the defect is no more than the natural and 
ordinary consequences of faulty workmanship, it is not caused by an accident.”), and Heile 
v. Herrmann, 736 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that faulty 
workmanship is not an “accident” and therefore not an occurrence), and U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Corp. v. Advance Roofing & Supply Co., 788 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Ariz. App. 1989) (“[M]ere 
faulty workmanship, standing alone, cannot constitute an occurrence as defined in the 
policy, nor would the cost of repairing the defect constitute property damages.”).   
 79.  See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880 N.W.2d 724, 742  (Iowa 2016) 
(stating that faulty workmanship that causes damage to property other than the defective 
workmanship itself is covered); Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 157 So. 3d 
148, 158 (Ala. 2014) reh’g denied (June 27, 2014) (same); Shane Traylor CabinetMaker, 
L.L.C. v. Am. Res. Ins. Co., 126 So. 163, 171 (Ala. 2013) (same); Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. 
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A. 3d 961, 981 (Conn. 2013) (same); Taylor Morrison Servs., 
Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 746 S.E. 2d 587, 595 (Ga. 2013) (same); Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 748 S.E.2d 781, 791 (S.C. 2013) (holding that the removal of defective 
signs was an occurrence); Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 519 
(W.Va. 2013) (overruling Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 83 
(W. Va. 2001)); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 979 N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ohio 
2012) (holding that defective work itself is not covered, but citing with approval cases that 
held separate property damage caused by defective work is covered); Town & Country 
Prop., L.L.C. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 111 So. 3d 699, 710 (Ala. 2011) (finding that damage 
to property separate from the faulty workmanship itself is covered but not the faulty work 
itself); Crossman Cmtys of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 717 S.E.2d 589, 594 
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Alaska,81 Connecticut,82 Florida,83 Georgia,84 Indiana,85 Iowa,86 Kansas,87
Minnesota,88 Mississippi,89 Montana,90 New Jersey,91 North Dakota,92 Ohio,93
(S.C. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of statute acknowledging occurrence to include 
damage caused by defective work going forward); Pulte Homes of N.M. v. Indiana 
Lumbermens Ins. Co., 367 P.3d 869, 878 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that faulty 
workmanship that causes damage to property other than the defective workmanship itself is 
covered).
 80.  See Town & Country Prop., LLC 111 So.3d at 710 (damage to property separate 
from the faulty workmanship itself is covered but not the faulty work itself); Shane Traylor 
CabinetMaker, LLC 126 So.3d at 171 (same); Owners Ins. Co. 157 So.3d at 158 (same). 
 81.  See Fejes 984 P.2d at 525 (“[A]n insured has coverage for his completed work 
when the damage arises out of work performed by someone other than the named insured, 
such as a subcontractor . . . .” (omission in original) (quoting Fireguard Sprinkler Sys., Inc. 
v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1988))). 
 82.  See Capstone Bldg. Corp. 67 A.3d at 981 (finding that damage to property separate 
from the faulty workmanship itself is covered but not the faulty work itself). 
 83.  See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. 979 So.2d at 888 (concluding that the “subcontractors’ 
defective soil preparation,” which caused damage to homes, was an occurrence under CGL 
policies).
 84.  See Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 
372 (Ga. 2011) (“[A]n occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or 
unexpected damage to other property.”). 
 85.  See Sheehan Const. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 171-72 (Ind. 2010) 
(concluding that the subcontractors’ defective work was a covered occurrence), modified on 
other grounds, 938 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 2010). 
 86.  See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880 N.W.2d 724, 740, (Iowa 2016) 
(“[W]e conclude the defective work performed by the insureds’ subcontractors falls within 
the definition of “occurrence” in the insuring agreement . . .”). 
 87.  See Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 137 P.3d at 493-95 (Kan. 
2006) (agreeing with the intermediate appellate court that the “damage occurring as a result 
of faulty or negligent workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not 
intend for the damage to occur.” (quoting Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
104 P.3d 997, 1002 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005))). 
 88.  See Wanzek Const., Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 679 N.W.2d 322, 325-27 
(Minn. 2004) (acknowledging that earlier decisions based upon Professor Henderson’s 1971 
law review article were incorrectly decided because the business risk exclusions were 
changed in 1986).
 89.  See Architex Ass’n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 (Miss. 2010) 
(concluding that “the term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude 
coverage for unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or 
conduct of a subcontractor, unless otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after 
loss.”).
 90.  See Revelation Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 P.3d 919, 922 
(Mont. 2009) (finding that claims against company that used a subcontractor to design a 
disposable sanitary bag that was defective were a covered “event” which was defined as an 
“accident,” an undefined term in the CGL policy).
 91.  Cypress Point Condo. Assocs. v. Adria Towers, LLC., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016) 
(finding that consequential damages caused by subcontractor’s defective workmanship are 
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence”). 
 92.  See K&L Homes, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 829 N.W. 2d 724 (N.D. 2013) 
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South Carolina,94 South Dakota,95 Tennessee,96 Texas,97 West Virginia,98 and 
Wisconsin99 all have held that construction defects can constitute occurrences.  
Four states – Arkansas,100 Colorado,101 Hawaii,102 and South Carolina103 – have 
(finding that damage to house caused by subcontractor’s faulty workmanship related to the 
house’s foundation was a covered occurrence). 
 93.  See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 979 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio 2012) 
(holding that defective work itself is not covered, but citing with approval cases that held 
separate property damage caused by defective work is covered). 
 94.  See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 684 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (S.C. 2009) 
(finding that defectively installed stucco resulted in a covered occurrence); Harleysville 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 736 S.E.2d 651 (S.C. 2012) (upholding the constitutionality of S.C. 
Code Ann. § 38-61-70 defining occurrence to include damage caused by defective work); 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 748 S.E. 2d 781 (S.C. 2013) (holding damage caused by 
defective outdoor advertising signs was an occurrence). See also Act of May 17, 2011, No. 
26, § 1, 2011 S.C. Acts 88, 88-89 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70) (providing that 
CGL “policies shall contain or be deemed to contain a definition of ‘occurrence’ that 
includes . . . property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive 
of the faulty workmanship itself.”). 
 95.  See Corner Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 N.W.2d 887, 894-95 (S.D. 
2002) (concluding that construction defects resulting in ventilation problems constituted an 
“accident” and such damage was covered by the policy at issue). 
 96.  See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 310 
(Tenn. 2007) (concluding that the defective installation of windows causing alleged water 
damage “constitute[s] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the CGL”). 
 97.  See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. 2007) 
(explaining that damage to the insured’s work as well as damage to a third party’s property 
can result from an “occurrence” as defined in commercial general liability policy and that no 
basis exists in the definition of “occurrence” to distinguish between the two). 
 98.  See Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. and Cas. Co., 745 S.E. 2d 508 (W.Va. 2013) 
(overruling Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 83 (W. Va. 2001), 
which held defective workmanship was not covered under CGL policies). 
 99.  See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Wis. 2004) 
(holding that excessive settlement of soil, which caused the building’s foundation to sink, 
was “‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the CGL policies’ 
general grant of coverage.”). 
 100.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a) (2016) (superseding Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 
261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008), (concluding that damages due to faulty workmanship are 
“foreseeable” and therefore, not covered).
 101.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808(3) (2016). 
 102.  See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:1-217 (2016).  Hawaii’s statute does not state 
that construction defects are occurrences.  Rather, it states that “[t]he meaning of the term 
‘occurrence’ shall be construed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time that the 
insurance policy was issued.” Id.  Although the statute was passed in response to an 
intermediate appellate court decision that held a subcontractor’s construction defects were 
not covered by the subcontractor’s CGL insurance (Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. 
Co., 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010)), the existing Hawaii Supreme Court precedent on 
the issue held that construction defects are occurrences. See Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. 
Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 904 (Haw. 1994) (finding subcontractor’s defects may be 
covered by CGL insurance and discussing what an “occurrence policy” entails). 
 103.  See S.C. CODE ANN. §38-61-70(b)-(d) (2016) (requiring commercial general 
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passed statutes that effectively provide that construction defects are occurrences.  
Currently, under existing state supreme court precedent, there are only three 
states – Arkansas, Kentucky and Pennsylvania – in which construction defects 
generally are not considered occurrences.104
The reasoning of the courts that have addressed the issue of whether 
construction defects are occurrences generally can be divided into one or more of 
the following schools of thought:  (1) construction defects are occurrences so 
long as the property damage was not expected or intended by the policyholder,105
(2) construction defects are occurrences to the extent property other than the 
work performed by the policyholder is damaged,106 or (3) construction defects 
are not occurrences because they are not “accidents.”107
1. Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Occurrences 
The holding most favorable to policyholders is that both the defective 
workmanship itself and the damage caused by it can constitute a covered 
occurrence.  Numerous courts have reached such a conclusion by applying the 
definition of “occurrence” contained in CGL policies to the facts at issue and 
liability insurance policies to include accidents and damage or injury from construction 
defects as part of the definition of “occurrence”). 
 104.  See Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Cenark Project Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 491 S.W. 3d 
135 (Ark. 2016) (concluding that claims for breach of warranty due to faulty workmanship 
are not covered under CGL policies); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306 
S.W.3d 69, 76 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that construction defects are not fortuitous events); 
Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 
899 (Pa. 2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under 
the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship.”).  The Columbia
decision muddies Arkansas law on the issue because ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a) 
expressly defines an “occurrence” under CGL policies to include defective workmanship.  
Nonetheless, in Columbia, the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to answer the certified 
question presented to it of whether “faulty workmanship resulting in property damage to the 
work or work product of a third party (as opposed to the work or work product of the 
insured) constitutes an ‘occurrence.’” See 491 S.W. 3d at 136.  Instead, based upon 
precedent predating ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a), the court simply concluded that 
claims for breach of warranty for faulty workmanship are not covered by CGL policies even 
though that was not even one of the certified questions the court was asked to address. Id.
In reaching its holding, the court declined to even address ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a). 
Consequently, there appears to be an inconsistency between Arkansas’ statutory and case 
law on the issue.  
 105.  This is further discussed in infra note 108. 
 106.  For more details on this, see cases cited infra notes 122 and 157. 
 107.  For more details on this, see cases cited infra note 158. The courts in this camp also 
often support their decisions with the additional arguments that: 1) construction defects 
should not be treated as “occurrences” because to hold otherwise would transform insurance 
into surety or performance bonds, and 2) construction defects should not be treated as 
“occurrences” because they are the result of intentional acts from which the resulting 
damage is a foreseeable consequence. Id.
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determining it was undisputed that the policyholder did not expect or intend to 
do the work defectively or cause the resulting damage.108  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s decision in American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
American Girl, Inc.109 is a seminal example of such a decision. 
In American Girl, a warehouse owner sued its contractor when the soil 
underneath the building settled, which resulted in the building being demolished 
because it was unsafe.110  A subcontractor did the soil work.111  The insurers 
denied coverage for the contractor’s claim based, among other reasons, on the 
arguments that:  1) the building owner’s claim was not covered because it was a 
claim for breach of contract or warranty as opposed to a tort claim, 2) defective 
workmanship cannot be an occurrence, and 3) the business risk exclusions 
barred coverage.112  To support their position, the insurers relied upon Professor 
Henderson’s 1971 law review article and the Weedo decision.113
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the insurers’ arguments and held 
that the contractor’s CGL insurance covered the building owner’s claims.114  In 
doing so, the court recognized that faulty workmanship can constitute an 
occurrence because defective work typically is done accidentally (i.e., 
unintentionally), relying upon Black’s Law Dictionary definition of an 
“accident” as “an event which takes place without one’s foresight or 
expectation.”115 In sum, the court reasoned: 
 108.  See, e.g., Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 745 S.E. 2d 508, 521 (W.Va. 
2013) (“[D]efective workmanship causing bodily injury or property damage is an 
occurrence under a policy of commercial general liability insurance.”); K&L Homes, Inc. v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 829 N.W. 2d 724 (N.D. 2013) (finding damage to house caused 
by subcontractor’s faulty workmanship related to the house’s foundation was a covered 
occurrence); Architex Ass’n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 (Miss. 2010) 
(“[T]he term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude coverage for 
unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or conduct of a 
subcontractor, unless otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after loss.”); 
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) (concluding 
that damage to the insured’s work, as well as damage to a third party’s property, can result 
from an occurrence as defined in the CGL policy, but that no basis exists in the definition of 
occurrence to distinguish between the two); Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 137 P.3d 486, 493 (Kan. 2006) (“[D]amage occurring as a result of faulty or negligent 
workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not intend for the damage 
to occur.”); Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 522-23 (Alaska 1999) (finding that the 
subcontractor’s defectively installed septic system was a covered occurrence under the 
contractor’s CGL policy where the defective septic system was replaced rather than 
repaired).
 109.  673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004). 
 110.  Id. at 69-70. 
 111.  Id. at 69. 
 112.  Id. at 75-76. 
 113.  673 N.W.2d at 77. 
 114.  Id. at 70-71. 
 115.  Id. at 76. 
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The threshold question is whether the claim at issue here is for “property 
damage” caused by an “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL policies' 
general grant of coverage.  We hold that it is.  The CGL policies define “property 
damage” as “physical injury to tangible property.”  The sinking, buckling, and 
cracking of the warehouse was plainly “physical injury to tangible property.”  An 
“occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition.”  The damage to 
the warehouse was caused by substantial soil settlement underneath the 
completed building, which occurred because of the faulty site-preparation advice 
of the soil engineering subcontractor. It was accidental, not intentional or 
anticipated, and it involved the “continuous or repeated exposure” to the “same 
general harmful condition.”  Accordingly, there was “property damage” caused 
by an “occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL policies.116
The court also rejected the argument that CGL policies cannot cover breach 
of contract claims, noting that the insuring agreement in CGL policies and the 
definition of “occurrence” do not make a distinction between contract claims and 
tort claims, and that the term “tort” does not appear in the policy language.117
Further, the court found the insurer’s reliance on Professor Henderson’s article 
and Weedo were misplaced because they addressed older versions of the 
business risk exclusions that were not at issue, and Weedo did not even address 
the issues of whether construction defects were occurrences or constituted 
property damage.118  The court also noted that the business risk exclusions would 
be unnecessary and redundant if construction defects could not be 
occurrences.119  Finally, the court held the business risk exclusions did not apply 
to the subcontractor’s work because of the subcontractor exception that was 
added in 1986.120
Numerous other courts have adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
analysis and holding in American Girl or reached similar conclusions prior to 
when American Girl was decided.121
2. Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Occurrences If Property 
Other Than The Defective Work Itself Was Damaged 
Many courts have held that construction defects can be occurrences, but 
only to the extent that property other than the defective work itself was damaged.  
This is becoming the majority position of the state supreme courts that have 
 116.  Id. at 70. 
 117.  Id. at 77. 
 118.  Id. at 77. 
 119.  Id. at 78. 
 120.  Id. at 83-84. 
 121.  See supra note 108.
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addressed the issue, with many of the decisions being issued since December 
2011.122  The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in United States Fire 
Insurance Co. v. J.S.U.B, Inc.123 is a leading example of the reasoning of the 
courts that have adopted this position. 
In J.S.U.B., the policyholder was a contractor that built several houses in 
Florida.124  After the houses were finished and the homeowners took possession 
of them, the homeowners discovered that there was damage to the houses’ 
foundations, drywall, and other interior parts.125  The parties agreed that the 
“subcontractors’ use of poor soil and improper soil compaction and testing” was 
the cause of the damage to the houses.126  The homeowners sued the general 
contractor asserting claims for “breach of contract, breach of warranty, 
negligence, strict liability, and violations of the Florida Building Code.”127
The CGL policy at issue contained the standard form definitions of 
 122.  See Town & Country Prop., LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 111 So. 3d 699 (Ala. 
2011) (holding that damage to property separate from the faulty workmanship itself is 
covered but not the faulty work itself); Shane Traylor, LLC v. Am. Res. Ins. Co., 126 So. 3d 
163 (Ala. 2013) (same); Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 157 So. 3d 148 
(Ala. 2014) (same); Capstone Bldg Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A. 3d 961 (Conn. 
2013) (same); Am. Empire Surplus Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 
2011) (“[A]n occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or 
unexpected damage to other property.”); Taylor Morrison Servs., Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. 
Ins. Co., 746 S.E. 2d 587 (Ga. 2013) (same); Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880 
N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 2016) (stating that faulty workmanship that causes damage to property 
other than the defective workmanship itself is covered); Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Adria Towers, LLC., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016) (explaining that property damage caused by 
subcontractor’s defective work, as opposed to the defective work itself, is covered); 
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 979 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio 2012) (holding that 
defective work itself is not covered, but citing with approval cases that held separate 
property damage caused by defective work is covered); High Country Assocs. v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (finding that property damage to 
condominium units caused by defective workmanship was an occurrence within the 
meaning of the CGL policy); Pulte Homes of N.M. v. Indiana Lumbermens Ins., 367 P. 3d 
869 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that faulty workmanship that causes damage to property 
other than the defective workmanship itself is covered); Crossman Cmtys., Inc. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 717 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
statute defining occurrence to include damage caused by defective work going forward); 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 748 S.E. 2d 781 (S.C. 2013) (holding that the removal of 
defective signs was an occurrence); Corner Const. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 
N.W.2d 887, 894-95 (S.D. 2002) (affirming the lower court’s ruling that construction 
defects resulting in ventilation problems constituted an accident and that such damage was 
covered by the policy at issue); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs. Inc., 216 
S.W.3d 302, 310 (Tenn. 2007) (“[D]efective installation [of windows] resulted in water 
penetration . . . [and] constitute[d] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the CGL.”). 
 123.  979 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2007). 
 124.  Id. at 875. 
 125.  Id.
 126.  Id.
 127.  Id.
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“occurrence” and “property damage” quoted and discussed in Part I of this 
article.128  Consequently, the term “accident” contained in the definition of 
“occurrence” was undefined.129
Although the insurer agreed to cover the personal property of the 
homeowners that was damaged due to the defective workmanship, the insurer 
argued that faulty workmanship itself “can never be an ‘accident’ because it 
results in reasonably foreseeable damages.”130  The insurer also argued that “a 
breach of contract can never result in an ‘accident,’”131 and that allowing 
recovery under insurance policies for defective construction work would convert 
“the policies into performance bonds.”132  Finally, the insurer argued that it 
would be against public policy to allow recovery under insurance policies for 
construction defects because of “moral hazard” concerns to the effect that 
allowing CGL insurance to cover defective workmanship and the damage 
caused by it would create a disincentive for contractors to perform their work 
competently.133
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected all of the insurer’s arguments and 
held there was coverage for the claims, which did not include a request for the 
costs to repair the defective workmanship itself.134  In doing so, the court first 
rejected the argument that the determination of whether the policyholder 
“expected or intended” the damage should be based on whether the damage was 
objectively foreseeable, stating as follows: 
The policy . . . in this case define[s] an “occurrence” as an 
“accident” but leave[s] “accident” undefined.  Thus, under [prior 
Florida precedent], these policies provide coverage not only for 
“accidental events,” but also injuries or damage neither expected 
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. . . . We expressly 
rejected the use of the concept of “natural and probable 
consequences” or “foreseeability” in insurance contract 
interpretation . . . .135
Second, the court rejected the argument that damages resulting from a 
breach of contract cannot be an occurrence: 
[T]here is nothing in the basic coverage language of the current 
CGL policy to support any definitive tort/contract line of 
demarcation for purposes of determining whether a loss is 
 128.  Id.
 129.  Id.
 130.  Id. at 876, 883. 
 131.  Id. at 884. 
 132.  Id. at 887. 
 133.  Id. at 890. 
 134.  Id. at 883-85. 
 135.  Id. at 883. 
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covered by the CGL’s initial grant of coverage.  “Occurrence” is 
not defined by reference to the legal category of the claim.  The 
term ‘tort’ does not appear in the CGL policy.136
Third, the court rejected the argument that allowing the policyholder to 
recover under its insurance policy would convert the insurance policy into a 
performance bond: 
[W]e reject [the insurer’s] contention that construing the term 
occurrence to include a subcontractor’s defective work converts 
the policies into performance bonds.  The purpose of a 
performance bond is to guarantee the completion of the contract 
upon default by the contractor.  Thus, unlike an insurance policy, 
a performance bond benefits the owner of a project rather than 
the contractor.  Further, a surety, unlike a liability insurer, is 
entitled to indemnification from the contractor.137
Fourth, the court rejected the “moral hazard” argument that allowing 
insurance recoveries for construction defects would increase the likelihood of 
contractors doing shoddy work: 
In reaching this conclusion, we discern no public policy reason for 
precluding coverage.  A subcontractor’s defective work that is neither 
intended nor expected from the standpoint of the insured is not the 
type of intentional wrongful act that we have held was uninsurable as 
a matter of public policy.  Even if a “moral hazard” argument could 
be made regarding the contractor’s own work, the argument is not 
applicable for the subcontractors’ work . . . .  “[I]t is as a practical 
matter very difficult for the general contractor to control the quality of 
the subcontractor work.  Only if the contractor has a supervisor at the 
elbow of each subcontractor at all times can quality control be 
relatively assured—but this would be prohibitively expensive.”138
Fifth, the court rejected the argument that only third party property that has 
been damaged separate from the project done by the contractor is recoverable 
property damage: 
[J]ust like the definition of the term “occurrence,” the definition 
of “property damage” in the CGL policies does not differentiate 
between damage to the contractor’s work and damage to other 
property.139   [W]e reject a definition of occurrence that renders 
damage to the insured’s own work as a result of a subcontractor’s 
 136.  Id. at 884 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 77 
(Wis. 2004)). 
 137.  Id. at 887-88. 
 138.  Id. at 890 (quoting STEMPEL, supra note 18). 
 139.   Id. at 889. 
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faulty workmanship expected, but renders damage to property of 
a third party caused by the same faulty workmanship 
unexpected.140
The court also stated in passing without explanation, however, that “[i]f 
there is no damage beyond the faulty workmanship or defective work, then 
there may be no resulting ‘property damage.’”141
Sixth, the court considered the Weedo decision and noted that the business 
risk exclusions at issue in that case were the pre-1986 business risk exclusions. 
Thus, the case generally was irrelevant.142
Finally, the court noted that the existence of the business risk exclusions 
themselves proves that construction defects may be occurrences: 
If . . . losses actionable in contract are never CGL “occurrences” 
for purposes of the initial coverage grant, then the business risk 
exclusions are entirely unnecessary. . . . Why would the 
insurance industry exclude damage to the insured’s own work or 
product if the damage could never be considered to have arisen 
from a covered occurrence in the first place?143
In short, the court held that property damage other than the defective 
workmanship itself caused by a subcontractor, including damage to the 
other portions of the project done by or for the contractor, constitutes an 
occurrence and is covered under a contractor’s CGL policies. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in Capstone Building Corp. 
v. American Motorists Insurance Co.144 is another recent example of a court 
holding that damage caused to property other than the defective workmanship 
itself constitutes a covered occurrence.  In Capstone, the policyholder was a 
general contractor who was hired to build student housing for the University of 
Connecticut.145  The policyholder hired a subcontractor to do the heating and air 
conditioning work, including the installation of hot water heaters.146  Within a 
few years of the project’s completion, the owner of the building sued the general 
contractor regarding, among other things, carbon monoxide gases escaping into 
the building, mold contamination, and water damage as a result of defective 
workmanship.147
When the policyholder tendered the claims to its insurer, the insurer denied 
 140.  Id. at 885. 
 141.  Id. at 889. 
 142.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 881-83 (Fla. 2007). 
 143.  Id. at 886-87 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 
78 (Wis. 2004)). 
 144.  67 A.3d 961 (Conn. 2013). 
 145.  Id. at 968. 
 146.  Id. at 984. 
 147.  Id. at 971, 978. 
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coverage, arguing “that defective construction lacks the element of ‘fortuity’ 
necessary for an accident” to qualify as an occurrence.148  The insurer also 
argued that CGL policies do not cover any of the repair costs associated with the 
policyholder’s work because such costs are not for property damage.149  The 
insurance policies at issue were standard form CGL policies that contained the 
same definitions of “occurrence” and “property damage” quoted and discussed 
in Part I of this article.150
In analyzing the coverage claim, the court distinguished between costs to 
fix the defective workmanship itself and costs to fix work that was not done 
defectively but that was damaged due to the defective workmanship.151  With 
respect to the defective workmanship itself and the other damage caused by it, 
the court held both could constitute an occurrence because “[a]n accident is an 
event that is unintended from the perspective of the insured” and negligent work 
done by the policyholder typically is unintentional.152  The court concluded, 
however, that although damage caused by defective workmanship was property 
damage, the defective workmanship itself was not.153
In reaching its decision, the court failed to explain why defective 
workmanship that has to be repaired or replaced is not property damage, while 
non-defective work that has to be repaired or replaced because it has been 
damaged was property damage.   Instead, the court simply quoted other cases 
that had reached such a result by analogizing defective workmanship to the 
installation of a defective component, which is not considered property damage 
unless the defective component causes damage to the rest of the product: 
[A] claim “in which the sole damages are for replacement of a 
defective component or correction of a faulty installation” was 
not within the policy’s definition of property damage.  “Without 
more, this alleged defect is the equivalent of the ‘mere inclusion 
of a defective component’ . . . and no ‘property damage’ has 
occurred.”154
This conclusory statement does not really explain how non-defective work 
that needs to be repaired or replaced due to defective workmanship is property 
damage, while the defective workmanship itself that also needs to be repaired or 
replaced is not property damage.  Indeed, the court even acknowledged that the 
definition of “property damage” does not make a distinction between the 
 148.  Id. at 975. 
 149.  Id. at 978. 
 150.  Id. at 974, 976. 
 151.  Id. at 980-81. 
 152.  Id. at 975-76. 
 153.  Id. at 980-81. 
 154.  Id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 
302, 310 (Tenn. 2007)). 
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construction project itself and other property: 
[W]e see no basis in the language of the policy for limiting 
coverage to liability for harm to third parties. “[J]ust like the 
definition of the term ‘occurrence,’ the definition of ‘property 
damage’ in the [CGL policy] does not differentiate between 
damage to the contractor's work and damage to other 
property.”155
Nor does the definition of “property damage” distinguish between defective 
workmanship and any other property.  To the contrary, “property damage” is 
defined simply as:  “physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting 
loss of use of that property.”156  Consequently, contrary to the court’s holding, if 
the work is defective and needs to be repaired or replaced, then it is at least 
reasonable to conclude that there has been “physical injury to” or the “loss of 
use” of the property because the property cannot be used in its defective 
condition.  If such an interpretation is reasonable, then contra proferentum
dictates that it should be accepted by the court. 
In sum, the courts holding defective work itself cannot be viewed as 
property damage have not offered a satisfying explanation why non-defective 
work that has been damaged and needs to be repaired or replaced because of 
defective workmanship constitutes property damage but the defective work itself 
that also needs to be repaired or replaced does not constitute property damage.  
In both instances, the property is unusable or damaged in its current state.  
Nonetheless, cases such as J.S.U.B. and Capstone represent the emerging 
majority view of state supreme courts – CGL policies allow the contractor to 
recover for property that is unexpectedly damaged as a result of faulty 
workmanship by a subcontractor, including other portions of the contractor’s 
work, but not for the faulty workmanship itself.157
 155.  Id. at 976 (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 889 (Fla. 
2007)).
 156.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 07, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (2007), supra note 2, app. J, § V(17), at 480. 
 157.  For more information on this emerging majority view, see supra note 122 and 
accompanying text. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70 (2011) (providing that CGL 
“policies shall contain or be deemed to contain a definition of ‘occurrence’ that includes . . . 
property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty 
workmanship itself.”); Lexicon, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 
2011) (explaining that “collateral damage” resulting from construction defects is considered 
an occurrence); Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parkshore Dev. Corp., 403 F. 
App’x 770, 772 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[C]onstruction defects resulting in consequential damage to 
the property itself could qualify as an ‘occurrence.’”); Stanley Martin Cos., Inc. v. Ohio Cas. 
Grp., 313 F. App’x 609, 614 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that any damage a subcontractor’s 
defective work caused to non-defective work constituted an occurrence); Mid-Continent 
Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Texas law and 
holding that the exclusion “bars coverage only for property damage to parts of a property 
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3. Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Not Occurrences 
Because They Are Not “Accidents” 
The minority position adopted by the Supreme Courts of Arkansas, 
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania is that construction defects cannot be “accidents” 
and thus, they should not be viewed as occurrences under the terms of CGL 
policies.158  There are also a number of decisions by other courts that have 
applied such reasoning, but they are not controlling precedent in their states 
because they were either decided before the supreme courts in their states 
addressed the issue, or their state legislatures have passed statutes effectively 
that were themselves the subjects of defective work, and not for damage to parts of a 
property that were the subjects of only nondefective work by the insured and were damaged 
as a result of defective work by the insured on other parts of the property.”); OneBeacon Ins. 
Co. v. Metro Ready-Mix, Inc., 242 F. App’x 936, 940 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Maryland 
law and holding that “coverage exists only to remedy unexpected and unintended property 
damage to the contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product caused by the . . . defective 
workmanship.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window 
Co., 984 So. 2d 1241, 1249 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that a policy provided coverage for 
costs to repair damage to windows caused by a subcontractor’s defective installation but not 
if the windows were defective prior to being installed); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that damage to a 
building caused by the installation of asbestos in the building was a covered occurrence); 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Neb. 2004) 
(“[A]lthough faulty workmanship, standing alone, is not an occurrence under a CGL policy, 
an accident caused by faulty workmanship is a covered occurrence.”); High Country Assocs. 
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477-78 (N.H. 1994) (explaining that faulty work 
in and of itself does not constitute an occurrence due to foreseeability, but damage resulting 
as a consequence of faulty work is covered under the policy); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith 
Constr., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33, 40, 42 (N.D. 2006) (concluding that damages to a roof that a 
contractor was replacing were excluded from coverage because to hold otherwise would 
convert the policy into a performance bond, but damages resulting from the defective roof to 
the interior of the apartment was covered under the policy); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. 
Rhodes, 748 S.E.2d 781, 791 (S.C. 2013) (holding that the removal of defective signs was 
an occurrence); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 736 S.E.2d 651, 655-59 (S.C. 2012) 
(upholding the constitutionality of S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70 which defines an occurrence 
to include damage caused by defective work).
 158.  See Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Cenark Project Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 491 S.W.3d 
135, 145-46 (Ark. 2016) (concluding that claims for breach of warranty due to faulty 
workmanship are not covered under CGL policies); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. 
Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Ky. 2010) (holding construction defects are not occurrences 
because they are not fortuitous events); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘accident’ 
required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based 
upon faulty workmanship.”). See supra note 104 (concluding that the law in Arkansas on 
this issue has become unclear because ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a) is inconsistent with 
the Columbia decision and the Supreme Court of Arkansas did not attempt to reconcile its 
opinion with the terms of the statute). 
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rejecting the minority position.159
In Pennsylvania, the controlling case is Kvaerner Metals Division of 
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.160  In Kvaerner, a 
manufacturing company entered into a contract to construct a coke oven battery 
for a steel company.161  The coke oven battery allegedly had numerous problems 
that the manufacturer failed to remedy, thereby resulting in a lawsuit.162  The 
coke oven battery manufacturer notified its insurer of the lawsuit and sought 
coverage under its CGL policies.163  The insurer denied coverage.164
The CGL policies at issue contained the standard form definitions of 
“occurrence” and “property damage” discussed in Part I of this article.165  In 
denying coverage, the insurer argued that: 
(1) the Policies only permitted coverage for allegations of 
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” which was 
defined by the Policies as an accident, and [the steel company] 
had not alleged that the [coke oven] Battery was damaged by 
such an occurrence, and (2) even if [the steel company] alleged 
property damage caused by an occurrence, such damages were 
excluded under various “business risk/work product” exclusions 
in the Policies.166
The court agreed with the insurer’s first argument.167  Because “accident” 
was not defined in the policy, the court looked to Webster’s dictionary to 
understand the meaning of the term and then concluded that faulty workmanship 
is not an accident: 
Words of common usage in an insurance policy are construed 
according to their natural, plain, and ordinary sense.  We may 
 159.  See, e.g., Lyerla v. Amco Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (using 
reasoning based upon old Illinois case law and stating that “damage to a construction project 
resulting from construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents 
the natural and ordinary consequence of faulty construction.”); Hathaway Dev. Co., Inc. v. 
Illinois Union Ins. Co., 274 F. App’x. 787, 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying old Georgia law 
and holding that the subcontractors’ faulty work was “an injury accidentally caused by 
intentional acts.”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008) (being 
decided prior to the passage of ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a)(2) (2011), and holding that 
“[f]aulty workmanship is not an accident; instead, it is a foreseeable occurrence, and 
performance bonds exist in the marketplace to insure the contractor against claims for the 
cost of repair or replacement of faulty work.”). 
 160.  908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006). 
 161.  Id. at 891. 
 162.  Id.
 163.  Id. at 891-92. 
 164.  Id. at 892. 
 165.  Id. at 897. 
 166.  Id. at 892. 
 167.  Id. at 899. 
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consult the dictionary definition of a word to determine its 
ordinary usage.  Webster’s II New College Dictionary 6 (2001) 
defines “accident” as “[a]n unexpected and undesirable event,” or 
“something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally.”  The 
key term in the ordinary definition of “accident” is “unexpected.”  
This implies a degree of fortuity that is not present in a claim for 
faulty workmanship.168
In reaching its decision, the court cited and relied on Professor Henderson’s 
1971 law review article dealing with the 1966 business risk exclusions.169  Those 
exclusions, however, had not been used in CGL policies for over two decades 
and were not at issue in the case.  Thus, the court did not actually address the 
business risk exclusions that were at issue.170  The court also did not address the 
relevant issue under an occurrence analysis — whether the coke battery 
manufacturer expected or intended to manufacture a defective piece of 
equipment. 
The continuing vitality of the Kvaerner decision in Pennsylvania currently 
is in question.  The continuing precedential effect of Kvaerner is in doubt not 
only because it is based on poor reasoning and is inconsistent with almost all of 
the decisions of other state supreme courts, but also because, in 2013, an 
intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court effectively refused to follow the 
decision by interpreting it very narrowly and then holding the insurer’s duty to 
defend was triggered by the construction defect claim at issue.171  Then, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court effectively affirmed the intermediate appellate 
court’s decision by declining to hear the appeal in the case.172  As was the case in 
New Jersey with Cypress Point, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may be 
willing to revisit its position on the issue when the right case is presented. 
In Kentucky, the leading precedent is Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Motorists 
Mutual Insurance Co.173  In Cincinnati Insurance, the policyholder was a 
homebuilder who was sued by a homeowner for building a house that allegedly 
was built so poorly that it needed to be razed.174  The CGL policy contained the 
same provisions regarding “occurrence” and “property damage” discussed in 
Part I of this article, and the insurer denied coverage for the claim on the basis 
 168.  Id. at 897-98 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 169.  Id. at 899 n.10 (citing Henderson, supra note 54, at 441). 
 170.  Id.  The court also incorrectly concluded that a finding of coverage would convert 
the policy into a performance bond. Id. at 899. 
 171.  Indalex Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 83 A.3d 418, 424-25 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2013) (interpreting Kvaerner narrowly and holding the insurer’s duty to defend a 
construction defect case was triggered), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014). 
 172.  Indalex Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014). 
 173.  306 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. 2010). 
 174.  Id. at 71. 
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that construction defects cannot be occurrences that cause property damage.175
In a case of first impression in Kentucky, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed 
with the insurer.  In explaining its decision, the court stated: 
The majority viewpoint . . . appears to be that claims of faulty 
workmanship, standing alone, are not “occurrences” under CGL 
policies.  Because we believe the majority viewpoint is correct, 
we adopt it.  Since the term accident is not defined in the policy, 
we must afford it its ordinary meaning, if that meaning is not 
ambiguous . . . . Inherent in the plain meaning of “accident” is the 
doctrine of fortuity.  Indeed, “[t]he fortuity principle is central to 
the notion of what constitutes insurance. . . .”  We recently 
recognized that the concept of fortuity is “inherent in all liability 
policies[,]” and explained that a loss was fortuitous if it was “not 
intended. . . .”  So “a loss or harm is not fortuitous if the loss or 
harm is caused intentionally by [the insured].”  As [the 
homebuilder] asserts, it is highly unlikely that [the homebuilder] 
subjectively intended to build a substandard house . . . . So 
adoption of [the homebuilder’s] viewpoint would mean that 
insurance policies would become performance bonds or 
guarantees because any claim of poor workmanship would fall 
within the policy’s definition of an accidental occurrence so long 
as there was not proof that the policyholder intentionally engaged 
in faulty workmanship.  This is a point made by other courts.  
Instead, we agree with the Supreme Court of South Carolina that 
refusing to find that faulty workmanship, standing alone, 
constitutes an “occurrence” under a CGL policy “ensures that 
ultimate liability falls to the one who performed the negligent 
work . . . instead of the insurance carrier.  It will also encourage 
contractors to choose their subcontractors more carefully instead 
of having to seek indemnification from the subcontractors after 
their work fails to meet the requirements of the contract.”176
The Cincinnati Insurance decision is laden with errors and poor reasoning.  
First, the court erroneously stated that it was adopting the majority position that 
construction defects cannot be occurrences.177  As discussed above, every state 
supreme court to address this issue other than Arkansas and Pennsylvania 
currently holds construction defects can constitute occurrences so long as some 
property damage apart from the defective work itself exists.178
Second, to support its position the court relied upon precedents that 
 175.  Id. at 72. 
 176.  Id. at 73-75 (citations omitted). 
 177.  Id. at 73. 
 178.  See cases cited in supra notes 108 and 122 and accompanying text. 
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subsequently have been overruled or superseded.179 For example, the court relied 
upon decisions in Colorado and South Carolina.180  Both of those states 
subsequently passed statutes that provide construction defects are occurrences.181
Thus, the court’s decision was based upon precedents that are no longer good 
law. 
Third, the court incorrectly concluded that defective workmanship cannot 
be accidental.182  How the court got to that erroneous conclusion is curious.  The 
court started its analysis by correctly making two points:  1) inherent in the 
definition of the term “accident” is the idea that the loss or harm must not be 
intentionally caused by the policyholder and 2) it is highly unlikely that the 
contractor intended to do the work defectively or to cause a loss or damage.183
From those correct statements, however, the court then mistakenly concluded 
that construction defects cannot be occurrences because that would mean that 
any time construction work is unintentionally done poorly by a subcontractor, 
and the defective work causes damage, there would be coverage unless an 
exclusion in the policy otherwise eliminates coverage.184  That is exactly what it 
means and, as quoted by Justice Cardozo above, that is one of the primary 
reasons why people and businesses buy insurance – to protect themselves against 
liability for injuries unintentionally caused by their negligence.185
Fourth, the court mistakenly concluded that allowing CGL policies to cover 
damage caused by construction defects would convert insurance policies into 
performance bonds and that the “ultimate liability [should fall] to the one who 
performed the negligent work . . . instead of the insurance carrier.”186
Transferring financial responsibility from the policyholder to an insurer for 
injuries or damage caused by the policyholder’s negligence is one of the 
principal purposes of insurance.  Although performance bonds are another type 
of risk spreading instrument, they are fundamentally different from liability 
insurance.187  Performance bonds protect the property owner, while liability 
 179.  Cincinnati Insurance, 306 S.W.3d at 73.  
 180.  Id.
 181.  For details on how occurrences are defined in the statutes, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 
13-20-808(3) (2016) and S.C. CODE ANN. §38-61-70(b)-(d) (2016). 
 182.  Cincinnati Insurance, 306 S.W.3d at 76. 
 183.  Id. at 74. 
 184.  Id. at 75. 
 185.  See supra note 42 (pointing out the very reason for which the insurance is 
obtained).
186. Cincinnati Insurance, 306 S.W.3d at 75 (quoting L–J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33, 37 (S.C. 2005), which was subsequently overruled by S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-61-70 (2011). 
 187.  See, e,g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 887-88 (Fla. 2007) 
(explaining that a performance bond’s purpose is to guarantee the completion of the 
contract, which benefits the owner of the project, and is therefore different from liability 
insurance, which protects the contractor). 
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insurance protects the contractor.188  And, unlike insurance policies, the issuer of 
a performance bond has a subrogation right against the contractor so that the 
ultimate liability for the defective work remains with the contractor under a 
performance bond.189
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH COURTS CAN
DECIDE WHETHER CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS ARE
OCCURRENCES
A. The “Moral Hazard” Problem 
As noted in the J.S.U.B. case, the “moral hazard” problem in the context of 
insuring a contractor against liability for construction defects is a theoretical 
concept used to support the argument that defective workmanship should not be 
viewed as an occurrence.190  Moral hazard is a term that originated in insurance 
law originally to describe “the risk an insured or insurance beneficiary would 
deliberately destroy the subject matter that was insured in order to obtain 
payment of an insurance benefit.”191  Today, the term also is used to encompass 
the idea that people who have insurance are less likely to take steps to avoid or 
minimize losses because the losses will be paid by someone else – in this 
instance, the insurer.192  One commentator has described moral hazard as 
follows:  “What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of 
 188.  Id.
 189.  Id.
 190.  Id. at 890. 
 191.  KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 7
(6th ed. 2015). Numerous scholars have written articles regarding moral hazard and offered 
similar descriptions of the concept. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R.
RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 12 (5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he existence of 
insurance can have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss. . . . This 
phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the 
Liability Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, 42, 47 (Robert E. 
Litan & Clifford Winston ed., 1988) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and 
characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss 
prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”); George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard 
refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance claims made 
by the insured. . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured 
to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics 
and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) 
(“‘Moral hazard’ is sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard’, the former referring to 
deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of 
carefulness.”) (citing C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981)). 
 192.  See supra note 191 (noting the moral hazard that may be inherent in how insurance 
works). 
2016] REVISITING CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS 141 
bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior.  The lesson of moral hazard 
is that less is more.”193   In the context of construction defects, the basic idea is 
that a contractor would have little incentive to perform his work well if insurance 
covered the damage his defective work causes. 
The argument has no more force in the construction defect context than it 
does in any other liability context where the policyholder is not personally at risk 
of harm from his own conduct.194  To some extent, insurance does buffer the 
policyholder from the financial consequences of his or her negligent behavior.  
That does not necessarily mean, however, that a person who has insurance will 
take more or less care than someone who does not.195  Indeed, proponents of the 
moral hazard theory do not point to any empirical evidence that a contractor 
actually reviews his or her insurance policy to determine whether the insurance 
will cover the resulting damage before proceeding to do a job sloppily. 
Moral hazard arguments also overlook a number of factors.  One, most 
people take pride in doing good work.  Two, contractors have incentives to do 
good work, despite the existence of liability insurance.  If the work is not done 
right, the contractor will not be paid.  Nor will the contractor be hired again.  
And, even if the contractor were able to eventually recover from his insurer as a 
result of litigation, very few litigants would describe litigation as a pleasant or 
valuable use of their time, particularly while they are trying to run a profitable 
construction business.  In short, moral hazard arguments in the context of 
construction defect claims are based solely on theory, not empirical facts. 
With that said, if the only goal were to maximize incentives for parties to 
take care and to avoid causing harm, then liability insurance theoretically should 
never be allowed because, at some level, its presence may be a disincentive to be 
as careful as possible.  Liability insurance is allowed despite this theoretical 
concern, however, because there are numerous other competing public policy 
considerations in play with respect to insurance. 
One such consideration is the compensation of injured parties. Public 
policy favors compensating innocent victims.196  Thus, in situations where a 
 193.  James K. Glassman, Drop Budget Fight, Shift to Welfare, ST. LOUIS POST–
DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1996, at B3. 
 194.  Moral hazard arguments have little force in situations where the policyholder could 
be hurt by the very conduct that gives rise to his liability. See, e.g., ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 191, at 8 (“[G]iven drivers’ instinct for self-protection, having auto 
liability insurance probably does not significantly influence driving behavior.”).   
 195.  See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An 
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (arguing that the adverse selection problem 
of only high risk people buying insurance, which is problem theoretically similar to moral 
hazard, has been overstated). 
 196.  See, e.g., Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (N.D. Okla. 2010) 
(explaining that compensating a wrongdoer’s innocent victims outweighs the concern that 
the wrongdoer would unjustly benefit); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. 
Supp. 155, 164-65 (E.D. Va. 1993) (concluding that compensating innocent victims, where 
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homeowner would go uncompensated in the absence of the contractor’s 
insurance (e.g., the contractor is insolvent or judgment proof),197 public policy 
favors allowing the homeowner to recover insurance proceeds from the 
contractor’s insurer regardless of whether the contractor could have or should 
have done the work right in the first place.  Indeed, ensuring that injured parties 
will be compensated is the primary reason automobile insurance is mandatory in 
this country.198
Another competing public policy is the enforcement of the terms of 
contracts.199  As one court has noted with respect to the multiple public policies 
at issue with respect to insurance, “[o]ne such policy is that an insurance 
company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for damages should 
honor its obligation.”200  Because insurers draft the language contained in their 
policies, they do not need to resort to theoretical moral hazard arguments to 
avoid honoring the deals they have entered or to avoid insuring certain types of 
claims.  Insurers have the right and ability to clearly state in their insurance 
policies the specific types of claims that are excluded from coverage.  Because 
insurers accept substantial premiums from contractors for CGL policies that 
cover all risks of loss that are not expressly excluded, and CGL policies do not 
the insurance policy does not explicitly exclude coverage of intentional acts, outweighs 
public policy of not permitting coverage of intentional action); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. 
Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 541 (Iowa 2002) (“Compensating . . . innocent victims . . . 
outweighs the concern that [the wrongdoer] will unjustly benefit from coverage.”); Vigilant 
Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]here is great public 
interest in protecting the interests of the injured party.”). 
 197.  See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603 (2006) (discussing the reasons why judgments against most people are uncollectible); 
Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1994) 
(discussing the impact insurance has on the judgment proof problem); Steven Shavell, The
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (analyzing the problems that 
result from judgment proof individuals). 
 198.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 191, at 924-25 (stating that the obvious 
purpose of mandatory auto insurance is to provide victims of automobile accidents with 
access to funds to cover their losses); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Insurance as a Social Instrument 
and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2010) (noting that every state 
effectively requires auto insurance in order to license a car). 
 199.  Sch. Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848-49 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (explaining that public policy favors enforcing the terms of insurance policies 
and “common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the trauma 
of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would normally 
neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have.”); Nw. Nat’l. Cas. Co. v. 
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the public 
policy favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 452 F. 
Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not lightly to be 
interfered with.  It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as against public 
policy.”).
 200.  Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. App. 1987).
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clearly state that construction defect claims are excluded, the public policy of 
enforcing contracts favors a finding that construction defect claims are covered. 
B. Application of the Rules of Insurance Policy Interpretation 
When one applies the relevant rules of insurance policy interpretation to the 
issue of whether construction defects constitute occurrences, the inescapable 
conclusion is that construction defects are occurrences unless the insurer can 
prove the policyholder actually expected or intended to do the construction work 
at issue defectively and expected or intended that it would cause damage.  The 
key term in the definition of “occurrence” – “accident” – is not defined in 
standard form CGL policies.  Under the doctrine of contra proferentem, to the 
extent there is any ambiguity in the meaning of “accident,” the courts should 
resolve those ambiguities in favor of the policyholder.201   Although the term can 
be interpreted in multiple ways, the common law definition of “accident” is an 
event that unexpectedly and unintentionally gives rise to injury or damage.202
Contractors generally do not expect or intend to do their work defectively so it is 
easy to conclude that most construction defects are accidental. 
The “expected or intended” exclusion contained in standard form CGL 
policies also supports the conclusion that property damage caused by defective 
workmanship is covered unless the damage is subjectively expected or intended 
by the policyholder.203  The exclusion does not state that coverage is forfeited if 
property damage is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the policyholder’s 
actions.  To the contrary, it states that coverage is excluded if the damage is 
“expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”204  Whether the 
damage is reasonably foreseeable should not be part of the analysis because 
reasonable foreseeability is not the standard set forth in the “expected or 
intended” exclusion found in CGL policies.  The test is subjective, not objective, 
and the issue is whether the damage was actually “expected or intended” by the 
policyholder, not whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable.205
The “reasonable expectations” doctrine arguably also favors a finding that 
construction defects are occurrences.206  It is reasonable to conclude that a 
primary reason a contractor buys CGL insurance is to obtain protection against 
claims related to his construction business.  Consequently, it is not difficult to 
conclude that a contractor reasonably expects that he will be covered for 
 201.  For more discussion on this doctrine, see supra Part II.A. 
 202.  See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 883 (Fla. 2007) 
(referencing a previous ruling that defined “accident” to include unexpected and unintended 
injuries or damages). 
 203.  For further discussion, see supra Parts I.A and II.D.2. 
 204.  For further discussion, see supra Part I.B. 
 205.  For further discussion, see supra Part II.D.2. 
 206.  For further discussion, see supra Part II.B. 
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construction defect claims brought against him because construction defect 
claims are among the most common types of claims asserted against contractors.  
To hold otherwise would render the coverage provided under CGL policies 
largely illusory for contractors. 
Construing CGL policies as a whole also leads to the conclusion that 
construction defects can be occurrences.  When one construes the provisions of 
CGL policies as a whole, instead of in parts, construction defects must 
potentially be occurrences in order for the business risk exclusions to have any 
purpose.  If construction defects cannot be occurrences, then what purpose do the 
business risk exclusions serve with respect to contractors?  There would be no 
need to exclude coverage for “defects” in “your work” or to include a 
subcontractor exception to the exclusion if construction defects were not covered 
occurrences under the basic insuring agreement language.207
Finally, the question of whether a contractor reasonably should expect to be 
held liable for negligently inflicted injuries is simply irrelevant.  Of course 
contractors, like everyone else, should expect to be held liable if their negligence 
causes injuries or damage.  Indeed, that is one of the main reasons people buy 
insurance.  Insurance is intended to cover the policyholder’s liabilities for injuries 
and damages that result from the policyholder’s negligence.  If liabilities that are 
reasonably foreseeable were not covered by CGL policies, then liability 
insurance would only provide illusory coverage in many situations because it is 
often reasonably foreseeable that negligent actions will lead to accidents, 
property damage, and ultimately liability. In the words of Justice Cardozo, “[t]o 
restrict insurance to cases where liability is incurred without fault of the insured 
would reduce indemnity to a shadow.”208
CONCLUSION
In determining whether there is an occurrence in the context of defective 
workmanship, the analysis should focus on whether the defects in the 
workmanship that gave rise to property damage was accidental and whether the 
contractor expected or intended his work to cause damage.  After years of 
misunderstanding this issue as a result of the Weedo decision, over the past 
decade, the overwhelming majority of state supreme courts, including the New 
Jersey Supreme Court that issued the Weedo opinion nearly forty years ago, have 
adopted this approach when addressing the issue.   They have concluded that 
unless the insurer can prove that the contractor expected or intended its 
workmanship to be defective and cause property damage, the faulty 
workmanship is an occurrence.   Thus, in most cases, whether the damage 
 207.  See, e.g., J.S.U.B., 979 So. 2d at 886-87 (discussing the reasons why faulty 
workmanship can be an occurrence); see also supra Part I.C. 
 208.  Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432, 432 (N.Y. 1921).
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associated with the defective workmanship is actually covered by CGL 
insurance should be determined based on an analysis of whether any of the 
business risk exclusions apply. 
